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Home Immigration Policy What’s Normal, What’s Not, About ODNI’s Request to Revise the NIC’s Intelligence Assessment

What’s Normal, What’s Not, About ODNI’s Request to Revise the NIC’s Intelligence Assessment

by Syed Tahir Abbas Shah
1 comment
Illustration of Venezuelan government and Tren de Aragua gang relationship map

Recent leaks have brought to light internal debates within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) regarding a sensitive intelligence assessment. The report concerns the alleged connection between the Venezuelan government and a violent gang called Tren de Aragua (TDA). This assessment has significant consequences for immigration policy under former President Trump.

But what really happened, and what should we make of these efforts to revise the intelligence? Understanding the facts—and separating political motives from normal intelligence processes—is essential for appreciating how the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) delivers strategic warnings to policymakers.

Background: Why the Intelligence Assessment Matters

The Trump administration’s immigration policy included deporting Venezuelan migrants linked to the TDA gang. This policy hinged on whether the Venezuelan government was directing or supporting the gang’s activities. If so, the U.S. could deport gang members under the Alien Enemies Act, a law that allows the removal of citizens from hostile nations.

However, if the gang acted independently and without direction from Caracas, the policy could face legal challenges. The intelligence community was tasked with providing a clear answer.

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The Timeline of Events: From Assessment to Controversy

  • Late January 2025: White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller asks the Intelligence Community for a detailed assessment of TDA and its ties to Venezuela.
  • Late February 2025: The National Intelligence Council (NIC), a respected group of senior intelligence officers, completes the first comprehensive report. This process usually takes about a month when no urgent deadlines are imposed.
  • March 15: President Trump invokes the Alien Enemies Act to begin deporting Venezuelan gang members.
  • March 20: The New York Times publishes a leaked story suggesting the intelligence assessment contradicts Trump’s policy, implying the policy could be illegal.
  • March 21: The Department of Justice opens an investigation into the leak. The Deputy Attorney General publicly disputes the New York Times’ claims.
  • March 24: Joe Kent, acting chief of staff for DNI Tulsi Gabbard, asks the NIC to “rethink” their conclusions, saying new evidence should be considered.
  • April 3: Kent sends emails suggesting the report needs rewriting “so this document is not used against the DNI or POTUS,” raising concerns about political influence.
  • April 7: The NIC releases an updated memo reaffirming the original assessment but adds more detail and nuance.
  • May 20: The New York Times publishes another article revealing internal emails. ODNI calls these stories “false and fabricated” and defends Kent’s service.

What Did the Intelligence Assessments Say?

Both intelligence memos concluded that the Venezuelan government does not control or direct the TDA gang’s criminal operations in the U.S. While the second memo noted that some officials might tolerate or cooperate with the gang for financial reasons, it emphasized this was limited and uncertain.

The memos provided detailed evidence supporting these conclusions:

  • Previous Venezuelan law enforcement actions against TDA.
  • The regime’s perception of TDA as a threat.
  • A complex relationship between Caracas and TDA—both cooperation and confrontation.
  • The decentralized structure of TDA itself.

Importantly, most intelligence agencies disagreed with the FBI’s view. The FBI believed some Venezuelan officials were helping TDA members migrate and operate abroad, based largely on interviews with detained migrants. However, other agencies discounted this testimony as unreliable because migrants had incentives to exaggerate or lie.

The memos also clearly outlined what signs would prompt analysts to change their view, such as evidence of weapons transfers or direct Venezuelan government operations supporting TDA.

What Was the ODNI’s Request to Change the Assessment?

Joe Kent and DNI Tulsi Gabbard’s office asked the NIC to revisit the report. Some argue this was political pressure to align the intelligence with President Trump’s policy goals, which would be inappropriate politicization of intelligence.

Others say the request was reasonable: new information had come in since the original assessment, and policymakers had the right to ask if the analysis needed updating. Reviewing old assessments in light of fresh evidence is standard practice.

What matters most is how the request was handled. Did the NIC face pressure to produce a specific conclusion, or did analysts retain their independence? Emails suggesting the need to rewrite the report to protect the president and DNI raise red flags.

Further complicating the issue, Kent was later nominated to lead the National Counterterrorism Center, where trust in his judgment is critical.

How Common Are Dissenting Views in Intelligence?

Dissent among agencies in intelligence assessments is normal and even encouraged. After intelligence failures like 9/11 and the Iraq WMD case, the community recognized that debate helps avoid groupthink and improves analysis.

The FBI’s dissent here fits a pattern: agencies tend to trust their own sources most. The FBI, involved in interviewing migrants, took their testimony seriously, while other agencies were more skeptical.

Why This Matters for National Security and Policy

Leaked documents and public disputes can erode trust in intelligence, especially when politicized. Oversight bodies exist to ensure that intelligence remains objective and unfiltered by political pressures.

The core mission of the intelligence community is to provide policymakers with unbiased, honest assessments. If analysts feel pressured to alter findings to suit political agendas, the country risks missing critical warnings that protect national security.

Illustration of Venezuelan government and Tren de Aragua gang relationship map

Conclusion: Balancing Political Interests and Intelligence Integrity

The controversy over the Venezuelan gang assessment shows the delicate balance between political leadership and the intelligence community’s independence.

It is normal and necessary for policymakers to request fresh analyses of intelligence when new information emerges. However, the process must remain free of pressure to shape analysis according to political desires.

For the U.S. to remain secure and make informed decisions, intelligence must be delivered with honesty and rigor. Only then can policymakers effectively defend the nation and uphold the rule of law.

WorldAffair.org is dedicated to providing in-depth analysis of global issues impacting U.S. foreign policy and national security.

Author Profile

Syed Tahir Abbas Shah
Syed Tahir Abbas is a Master's student at Southwest University, Chongqing, specializing in international relations and sustainable development. His research focuses on U.S.-China diplomacy, global geopolitics, and the role of education in shaping international policies. Syed has contributed to academic discussions on political dynamics, economic growth, and sustainable energy, aiming to offer fresh insights into global affairs.

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1 comment

Chathuni May 26, 2025 - 2:49 am

Your writing style is so engaging! I could visualize everything you described. Keep up the amazing work!

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